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NOTES
THE MORE? UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE (AND A PRACTICAL WAY
TO MAKE IT BETTER)*
Sean Patrick Flynn**
INTRODUCTION
Army Regulation dictates that “[s]ideburns are hair grown in front of
the ear and below the point where the top portion of the ear attaches to the
head. Sideburns will not extend below the bottom of the opening of the
ear,”1 and “[f]emales will not exceed a nail length of 1/4 inch as measured
from the tip of the finger.”2 United States Navy Uniform Regulation states
that on the right shoulder of a flight suit the “[w]eapons school patch (if
authorized) shall be worn centered on the shoulder arch, approximately 1
inch below the seam.”3
Uniformity matters to the professional appearance of those that serve in
the Armed Forces. In some situations, uniformity may save lives. However,
the importance placed on uniformity has not translated to uniform punishments for those who violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).4
In an effort to resolve this, the Military Justice Review Group (MJRG) recom* This is an updated version of the Note that appears in the print edition of this
volume of the Notre Dame Law Review.
** Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018; Bachelor of Science,
United States Military Academy at West Point, 2012. I would like to thank Colonel Charles
L. Pritchard, Jr., for helpful suggestions at the beginning of the writing process, the Notre
Dame Law Review for providing tremendous editing and lifelong friendships, Professor Jay
Tidmarsh, my advisor, whose guidance has extended far beyond this Note, Captain Patrick
Kelly, my life editor, without whom I would be lost, and my family, for all their support.
Finally, thank you, Ann-Marie—my amazing wife—home is wherever I’m with you, I love
you. All errors are my own.
1 U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and
Insignia ¶ 3-2a(2)(a) (2015).
2 Id. ¶ 3-2b(4)(c).
3 U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Uniform Regulations. art. 6803 ¶ 3a(4)(f).
4 See infra Part I.
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mended Congress, through the Military Justice Act of 2016 (“the Act”), establish an entity to develop sentencing parameters for the military.5 Congress
declined to establish such an entity explicitly, but did create the Military Justice Review Panel (“the Panel”) to study, assess, and make recommendations
regarding military sentencing to Congress.6 Among other things, the Act
purports to bring military sentencing more in line with the federal sentencing system, which was created in part due to disparate sentences.7 With the
goal of increased uniformity, the federal system and Federal Sentencing
Guidelines increased the length of sentences defendants received across the
board.8 If sentencing parameters come about in the military, they may have
a similar effect on military sentences.
Part I of this Note examines the military court-martial sentencing system
and analyzes some of the impetus for a change. It also assesses the changes,
in regards to sentencing, that the Act would bring about. Part II examines
the negative aspects of the federal sentencing system. Part III offers suggestions for ways to improve military sentencing moving forward. This Note
concludes that the military sentencing process should offer a guaranteed, but
waivable, two days of preparation to the defendant post-conviction and
presentencing.
I. THE CASE

FOR A

CHANGE

IN

MILITARY SENTENCING

Prior to the UCMJ, a “commander historically had virtually unchecked
control over military justice.”9 After World War II, though, protests against
an unfair and unduly harsh system led Congress to adopt the UCMJ in
1951.10 The UCMJ, and the individual services, went through many changes
after its adoption in an effort to improve military justice.11 The changes were
successful enough to prompt praise from Justice Ginsburg, who described
the new military justice system as “notably more sensitive to due process concerns than the one prevailing through most of our country’s history.”12
5 See infra Part I.
6 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
9 Note, Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 937, 940 (2010).
10 Id. The UCMJ “was meant to strike a balance between the individual rights of servicemembers and fairness, on the one hand, and the interest in maintaining discipline and
command authority, on the other.” Id.
11 Id. at 940–41. Those improvements included appellate courts within each branch of
the military, the creation of military judges and a requirement that one be present at every
court-martial, and independent chains of command for defense counsel. Id.
12 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

2017]

the more? uniform code of military justice

2181

A. The Military System
Chapter 47 of Title 10 in the United States Code encompasses the
UCMJ.13 Articles 55 through 58 of the UCMJ govern the military sentencing
process.14 Article 53 is also relevant, declaring, “[a] court-martial shall
announce its findings and sentence to the parties as soon as determined.”15
Either a panel (jury) or a military judge decides the outcome of the case.16 If
guilt is found, the deciding entity determines the sentence.17
After the trial and “findings of guilty have been announced, the prosecution and defense may present [the] matter . . . to aid the court-martial in
determining an appropriate sentence.”18 A panel, composed of officers (and
at least one-third enlisted members, if the accused is enlisted and so
requests)19 who outrank the accused, receives “appropriate instructions on
sentenc[ing]” from the military judge.20 The required instructions must
include a statement of (1) any mandatory maximum or minimum, (2) the
effect of a punitive discharge and confinement or a confinement greater
than six months on the accused’s pay, (3) the procedures for deliberation,
(4) the members’ sole responsibility for choosing an appropriate sentence,
and (5) “[a] statement that the members should consider all matters in
extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation, whether introduced before or after
findings, and matters introduced under R.C.M. 1001(b)(1), (2), (3) and
(5).”21 The military judge also informs the members of the panel of the five
reasons principally considered by society in sentencing: “rehabilitation of the
wrongdoer, punishment of the wrongdoer, protection of society from the
wrongdoer, preservation of good order and discipline in the military, and
deterrence of the wrongdoer and those who know of [the] crime[ ] and . . .
sentence.”22
13 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2016).
14 See UCMJ art. 55–58, 10 U.S.C. §§ 855–58. Besides the sentencing of convicted servicemembers, the rest of a court-martial essentially follows the structure of a federal criminal trial. Colin A. Kisor, The Need for Sentencing Reform in Military Courts-Martial, 58 NAVAL L.
REV. 39, 41 (2009).
15 UCMJ art. 53, 10 U.S.C. § 853.
16 Kisor, supra note 14, at 41 n.13 (“The accused at a court-martial elects a members
trial or a bench trial. The Government cannot impose a particular forum.”).
17 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 1006–07 (2016) [hereinafter MCM].
18 Id. R.C.M. 1001(a)(1).
19 UCMJ art. 25, 10 U.S.C. § 825.
20 MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1005(a).
21 Id. R.C.M 1005(e). The relevant considerations under R.C.M. 1001 are service data
of the accused (including pay and time and jobs in service), any other records of the
accused’s service (to include evaluation reports, marital status and number of dependents,
and other disciplinary actions), evidence of other prior convictions, and evidence of rehabilitative potential (but only in the form of opinions). See id. R.C.M. 1001.
22 U.S. DEP’T. OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-9, LEGAL SERVICES: MILITARY JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK ¶ 2-6-9 (2014).
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There are only a handful of articles of the UCMJ whose violation carry a
mandatory minimum. Premeditated and felony murder carry a minimum
sentence of imprisonment for life.23 Any rape, sexual assault, forcible sodomy (violations of Article 120(a) and (b)24 and Article 125),25 or attempt to
commit any of the above, carries a mandatory minimum of dismissal or dishonorable discharge.26 Other punitive articles of the UCMJ state that the
convicted “shall be punished as a court-martial may direct” or other similar
language.27
Upon conclusion of the court-martial “[t]he findings and sentence of a
court-martial shall be reported promptly to the convening authority after the
announcement of the sentence.”28 Although the ability has been
restricted,29 the convening authority may still grant clemency in certain situations.30 A servicemember sentenced to death, one year or more confinement, or a punitive discharge (dishonorable or bad conduct) receives a
review from the appropriate court of criminal appeals.31 Following review at
the Service Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF) reviews cases (1) with a death sentence, (2) ordered to the CAAF by
the Judge Advocate General of the relevant service, and (3) cases that it
grants review for good cause shown upon petition of the accused.32 Finally, a
case may be appealed to the United States Supreme Court.33
23 UCMJ art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918.
24 UCMJ art. 120(a)–(b), 10 U.S.C. § 920.
25 UCMJ art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925.
26 UCMJ art. 56, 10 U.S.C. § 856. “The most serious type of punitive discharge is a
dishonorable discharge for enlisted members or a dismissal for officer members.” Elizabeth Cameron Hernandez, Is “Mandatory Justice” Right for the Military?, 27 FED. SENT’G REP.
131, 133 (2015).
27 UCMJ art. 81–134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 881–934.
28 UCMJ art. 60, 10 U.S.C. § 860.
29 See James E. Baker, Is Military Justice Sentencing on the March? Should It Be? And If So,
Where Should It Head? Court-Martial Sentencing Process, Practice, and Issues, 27 FED. SENT’G REP.
72, 79 (2014). When he wrote the cited article, James E. Baker was the Chief Judge for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. See id. at 72.
30 UCMJ art. 60(c)(2)(B), 10 U.S.C. § 860(c)(2)(B) (“Except as provided in paragraph (4), the convening authority . . . may approve, disapprove, commute, or suspend the
sentence of the court-martial in whole or in part.”). The cases where the convening
authority may not grant any type of clemency are those in which the court-martial sentenced the defendant to more than six months confinement or a dismissal, dishonorable
discharge, or bad conduct discharge. Id. § 860(c)(4)(A). An exception here is if the
defendant provided “substantial assistance” in the investigation or prosecution of another,
or a qualifying pretrial agreement was entered. Id. § 860(c)(4)(B)–(C).
31 UCMJ art. 66(b)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 866. The branches of the military have separate
courts of criminal appeals. The Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard have their own, and the
Navy and Marine Corps (as a part of the Navy) both appeal to the Navy-Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals. See Kisor, supra note 14, at 42.
32 UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867.
33 Kisor, supra note 14, at 42.
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B. Complaints with the Military System
Critics of the sentencing system in the military argue that, for panel sentencing, the panel is unfamiliar with norms for similar crimes.34 This problem may have been exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s extension of courtsmartial jurisdiction to servicemembers even if the crime has no military connection.35 While panel members may be well suited to understand the gravity and appropriate sentencing for military-related offenses, for other cases
they may “have no frame of reference.”36 Members are not permitted to
receive information about sentences for other comparative cases, unless it is
introduced by the defense, at which point the prosecution may respond.37
In some cases, jurors will readily admit they are unprepared and ill equipped
to deliver an appropriate sentence to a convicted servicemember38 because
they are cognizant “that the accused’s sentence should not be considerably
different from other accused who are similarly situated.”39
Also relevant in a military context is that the jury members, for the most
part, are subordinates of the authority who convened the general court-martial. Therefore, the UCMJ specifically prohibits unlawful command influence, because of the concern that it may cause a miscarriage of justice.40 It
states:
No authority convening a general, special, or summary court-martial,
nor any other commanding officer, may censure, reprimand, or admonish
the court or any member, military judge, or counsel thereof, with respect to
the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other
exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceeding. No person
subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized
means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal
or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any case, or
the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect
to his judicial acts.41
34 Id. at 44 (“[M]embers often lack sufficient experience with the criminal justice system to determine reasonable lengths of prison terms in the absence of guidance . . . .”).
35 See Solario v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450–51 (1987).
36 Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Court-Martial Sentencing with Members: A Shot in the Dark?, 35
REP. 33, 34 (2008).
37 Megan N. Schmid, This Court-Martial Hereby (Arbitrarily) Sentences You: Problems with
Court Member Sentencing in the Military and Proposed Solutions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 245, 252 (2011).
38 See James A. Young III, Revising the Court Member Selection Process, 163 MIL. L. REV. 91,
111 n.112 (2000) (presenting anecdotal evidence that “several officers who sat on courtsmartial complained that military judges did not provide them realistic guidance on how to
determine an appropriate sentence”).
39 Id. at 114.
40 See UCMJ art. 37(a), 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2016).
41 Id.
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The arguments for and against jury sentencing in the military are similar
to those in civilian criminal justice.42 One argument in favor of jury sentencing is that “jury members are better able to express the community’s outrage
at an offender’s violation of its norms.”43 Another is that juries will not feel
political pressure to sentence in a certain way.44 But in the military context,
“[t]his argument carries little to no weight . . . because military judges are not
elected and they report through a separate chain of command from the convening authority.”45 In fact, given the facts of command and evaluations, the
military juries may actually feel more pressure to impose a harsh sentence
than a military judge.
Moreover, the current sentencing system can lead to unacceptable disparities in sentences for crimes with similar facts. For example, in November
1994, Private First Class (PFC) Looney was with some friends before going
out to the bars.46 PFC Looney “displayed a knife to his companions and
indicated that he was ‘ready’ if any trouble broke out and that he had the
group ‘covered.’ ”47 After drinking throughout the evening, although not
getting drunk, PFC Looney and one of his good friends (the victim) got into
a physical altercation. Punches were being thrown and landed, and eventually another soldier stepped in between.48 While the soldier was restraining
PFC Looney the victim punched PFC Looney in the face. The soldier then
turned to restrain the victim and PFC Looney “landed what appeared to be a
direct blow to [the victim’s] upper body.”49 PFC Looney immediately left the
establishment and, while his friends followed, the victim collapsed, and later
died due to a “lateral, penetrating stab wound to the heart, entering from the
left side of the chest.”50 PFC Looney was convicted of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to 120 months confinement.51
In a separate incident, PFC Saulsberry and his roommates were watching
television in his barracks room.52 Evidence showed that PFC Saulsberry did
not really “fit in” with his unit, and the other soldiers “constantly teased and
criticized him.”53 Another soldier in the unit (the victim) entered the room,
took a drink from the fridge, and began changing the channels on the television. An argument between PFC Saulsberry and the victim turned into a
42 See generally Brian M. Thompson, Judge-Only Sentencing: Judicial Power Grab?, 36
REPORTER 12 (2009).
43 Schmid, supra note 37, at 255.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 United States v. Looney, 48 M.J. 681, 683 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 682. PFC Looney was tried before a military judge. Id.
52 United States v. Saulsberry, 47 M.J. 493, 494 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
53 Id.
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shoving match.54 PFC Saulsberry turned to retreat and the victim “attacked
him from behind, threw him on the bed, and put his hands around his
throat.”55 The other soldiers broke it up, and while the victim was speaking
to one of them, PFC Saulsberry “retreated to the corner of the room and sat
on his bed, muttering and playing with a boot knife.”56 Shortly thereafter,
the victim again approached PFC Saulsberry and began taunting and cursing
at him.57 PFC Saulsberry “stood up and jabbed the knife” at the victim, who
“died as a result of a single stab wound that penetrated between two ribs and
pierced his heart.”58 PFC Saulsberry was convicted of unpremeditated murder and sentenced to 360 months confinement.59 PFC Saulsberry was sentenced to 240 more months confinement for a crime similar to the one PFC
Looney committed.
Sentencing disparity exists in other crimes too. Seaman Kirkman was
convicted for rape, where the victim was drunk and regained consciousness
while he was raping her. Seaman Kirkman was sentenced to eighty-nine days
confinement and given a bad-conduct discharge.60 Hospitalman Apprentice
Iberra, one pay grade below Seaman Kirkman, raped a drunk victim who
woke up during the rape, and he was sentenced to forty-eight months confinement and received a dishonorable discharge.61
The sentencing disparity at the trial level is not just anecdotal. General
courts-martial for violations of Article 118 (murder)62 have produced a standard deviation in sentencing of 172 months (for convictions not including
life as a minimum sentence).63 In general courts-martial for Article 120 violations (rape),64 the standard deviation among all four branches for sentenc54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 493. PFC Saulsberry was convicted and sentenced before a panel consisting of
officers and enlisted personnel. PFC Saulsberry’s murder conviction was later reduced to
voluntary manslaughter, and a mandated rehearing resulted in seventy-eight months confinement, which was approved by the convening authority. Id. at 493–94.
60 United States v. Kirkman, No. NMCM 98 01264, 2000 WL 349760, at *1 (N-M. Ct.
Crim. App. Mar. 30, 2000). Seaman Kirkman was convicted and sentenced by a panel of
officers and enlisted members.
61 United States v. Ibarra, 53 M.J. 616, 617 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000). Hospitalman
Apprentice Iberra was also convicted and sentenced by a panel of officers and enlisted
members. His conviction was later overturned by the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals because of plain error on the part of the military judge in allowing testimony
concerning the invocation of a right to counsel and against unreasonable search and
seizure. The testimony concerned the search for a drug used to possibly incapacitate the
defendant. Id. at 618.
62 UCMJ art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2016).
63 Steven M. Immel, Development, Adoption, and Implementation of Military Sentencing
Guidelines, 165 MIL. L. REV. 159, 192 (2000).
64 UCMJ art. 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920.
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ing is 155 months confinement, and 196 months confinement if all sentences
of twenty-four months or less are not factored in.65 Finally, violations of Article 112(a)(3) (wrongful distribution of a controlled substance)66 resulted in
a standard deviation in sentencing of thirty-one months.67
The lack of uniform military sentencing presented is perhaps unsurprising given that the Court of Military Appeals (the precursor to the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces) determined in United States v. Mamaluy that
uniformity in sentencing throughout the Armed Forces is not something with
which a court-martial should concern itself.68 This took greater effect when
“sentence uniformity was deleted as a sentencing goal in the 1969 Manual for
Courts-Martial.”69 It was believed that the appellate courts would ensure sentence uniformity by monitoring and fixing inappropriate sentences.70 However, given the strict standards for appellate review, most sentences are left
intact.71 Therefore, sentencing disparity at the trial level will likely be carried
out.72
C. The Proposed Solution to Military Sentencing
In response to a request from senior military officials, in October 2013
then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed a review of the UCMJ and
the Manual for Courts-Martial.73 The task was assigned to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, who in turn established the MJRG.74 In
December 2015, the Defense Department “forwarded to Congress a legislative proposal outlining a number of reforms [to] [t]he UCMJ[,] . . . the statutory framework of the military justice system.”75 It consisted of “37 statutory
additions and substantive amendments to 68 current provisions of the
UCMJ.”76 The proposals were intended to: (1) strengthen the structure of
65 Immel, supra note 63, at 191.
66 UCMJ art. 112(a)(3), 10 U.S.C. § 912.
67 Immel, supra note 63, at 192.
68 See United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 180 (C.M.A. 1959).
69 Immel, supra note 63, at 172.
70 See id. at 193 n.309.
71 Id. (“The appellate courts review a sentence on uniformity grounds only if the cases
are closely related and highly similar. The standard of review is abuse of discretion or
preventing an obvious miscarriage of justice. The end result is that the appellate courts
review very few cases on sentence uniformity issues. Since the appellate courts review very
few cases on sentence uniformity grounds, and when they do review a case the standard of
review is very high, the vast majority of sentences are left intact.”).
72 See id.
73 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Defense Department Proposes UCMJ Changes
(Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/638108/defense-department-proposes-ucmj-changes.
74 MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., http://ogc.osd.mil/mjrg.html (last visited Dec. 19,
2017).
75 Press Release, supra note 73.
76 Id.
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the military justice system, (2) enhance fairness and efficiency in pretrial and
trial procedures, (3) modernize military sentencing, (4) streamline the posttrial process, (5) reform military appellate practice, and (6) update the punitive articles.77
In order to modernize military sentencing, the MJRG proposed
[r]eplacing the current sentencing standard (which relies on maximum
punishments with minimal criteria in adjudging a sentence below the maximum) with a system of judicial discretion guided by parameters and criteria[,] . . . [e]nsuring that each offense receives separate consideration for
purposes of sentencing to confinement[,] . . . [i]mproving military plea
agreements by allowing negotiated ranges of punishments and adjudged
sentences within the range[,] . . . [c]ontinuing to permit appeals of
sentences by servicemembers, and establishing government appeals of
sentences in circumstances similar to federal civilian practice[,] . . . [and]
[p]roviding for the effective implementation of [sentencing] reforms by
establishing sentencing by military judges in all non-capital trials.78

Of most relevance here is the development of parameters. In order to
develop the parameters, the MJRG recommended the creation of the Military
Sentencing Parameters and Criteria Board (“the Board”). The Board, over
two phases, was to “draw upon best practices at the federal and state level” in
developing the parameters that would “replace the current practice of
adjudging a sentence with little or no guidance.”79
The reaction to the recommended changes was mixed,80 and ultimately,
the recommendations by the MJRG were not incorporated in total. Nonetheless, the Act was placed into the National Defense Authorization Act for 2017,
which became law on December 23, 2016.81 Congress did adopt, for the
77 Id.
78 Press Release, Military Justice Review Grp., Summary of Major Legislative Proposals
(Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.dod.gov/dodgc/images/summary.pdf.
79 MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., REPORT OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GROUP 32
(2015).
80 Compare Colby Vokey, The Gutting of Military Justice (Again), COLBYVOKEY.COM (Oct.
19, 2016), http://colbyvokey.com/the-gutting-of-military-justice-again/ (“The Military Justice Act of 2016 may just be the death knell of military justice and the rights of military
servicemembers.”), with Clara Spera, Amending the Uniform Code of Military Justice to Mirror
Civilian Courts, LAWFARE (Jan. 12, 2016 2:02 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/amendinguniform-code-military-justice-mirror-civilian-courts (“[S]hifting the military justice system
closer to the civilian criminal justice model may help the military overcome the perception
that in military tribunals the deck is stacked against victims of sexual assault.”).
81 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130
Stat. 2025 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). There was never really any
concern about the Act passing once it was inserted into the NDAA. See Jessica C. Abrahams
& Kevin J. Lombardo, November Elections Loom over Congress’ Continued Progress on National
Defense Authorization Act, LEXOLOGY (Oct.11, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/
⊃999378-599a-4f12-a631-c52c355fde8b
(“Although differences remain
detail.aspx?g⊃
unresolved in conference and between Congress and the Administration, the NDAA has
been signed into law every year for more than 50 straight years, and while continued negotiations
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imposition of sentences, the language recommended by the MJRG, with the
exception of the recommendation for guiding parameters, stating:
[A] court-martial shall impose punishment that is sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to promote justice and to maintain good order and discipline in the armed forces, taking into consideration—
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the accused;
(B) the impact of the offense on—(i) the financial, social, psychological, or medical well-being of any victim of the offense; and (ii) the mission,
discipline, or efficiency of the command of the accused and any victim of the
offense;
(C) the need for the sentence—(i) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense; (ii) to promote respect for the law; (iii) to provide just punishment
for the offense; (iv) to promote adequate deterrence of misconduct; (v) to
protect others from further crimes by the accused; (vi) to rehabilitate the
accused; and (vii) to provide, in appropriate cases, the opportunity for
retraining and return to duty to meet the needs of the service; and
(D) the sentences available under this chapter.82

Congress declined, however, to take away the sentencing authority of
panel members,83 and member sentencing is still unitary.84 Additionally,
Congress did not create a system of judicial discretion guided by parameters,
nor delegate that responsibility to a different entity. Instead, Congress
directed the establishment of the Panel.85
The Panel will consist of thirteen members, appointed with various conditions by the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Judge
Advocates General of the military branches and the Staff Judge Advocate to
the Commandant of the Marine Corps.86 In fiscal year 2020 the Panel, in
addition to reviewing and assessing the amendments made to the UCMJ during the previous five years, “shall gather and analyze sentencing data collected from each of the armed forces from general and special courts-martial
applying offense based sentencing.”87 It will also be responsible for periodic
and horse-trading must take place after the November elections, ultimately the NDAA will
become law before year’s end.” (emphasis added)).
82 Compare National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114328, § 5301, 130 Stat. 2920, with MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., supra note 79, at 516–17.
The factors to be considered are much more extensive than previously provided. See supra
notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
83 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328,
§ 5236, 130 Stat. 2917 (“If the accused is convicted of an offense in a trial by general or
special court-martial consisting of a military judge and members and the accused elects
sentencing by members . . . the members shall sentence the accused.”).
84 Id. § 5301, 130 Stat. 2920.
85 Id. § 5521, 130 Stat. 2962.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 130 Stat. 2963.
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interim reviews, and each year during which it was responsible for reviews
and assessments it “shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives a report setting forth the results of
such review and assessment, including the Panel’s findings and
recommendations.”88
While not as drastic of a change to military sentencing as the creation of
the Board would have been, the creation of the Panel may be a harbinger of
more change coming in military sentencing.
II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING SYSTEM
Despite good intentions, the implementation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines has been to the detriment of defendants. Before the Guidelines,
“[j]udges were free to sentence defendants to any term authorized by the
penal code,” and sometimes “offenders convicted of equivalent offenses . . .
served disparate sentences.”89 Because of this, “some critics began to condemn the horror stories about identical offenders before different judges”
receiving disparate sentences.90 Frustration with the sentencing system and
concerns about crime led Congress to take action.91 The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines began with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA)92, which
created the United States Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”).93
The Commission originally consisted of seven voting members and a
nonvoting member,94 and had the express tasks of “establish[ing] sentencing
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system” and
“develop[ing] means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing,
penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of
88 Id.
89 J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 700 (2011) (citing Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949), superseded by statute, Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988, 1989 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.)).
90 Id. Senator “Kennedy came to view sentencing in the federal courts as ‘a disgrace,’
‘a national scandal,’ a ‘glaring flaw,’ in ‘utter disarray,’ ‘hopelessly inconsistent,’ ‘arbitrary,’
and ‘desperately’ in need of reform.” KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 38 (1998).
91 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 90, at 38–48.
92 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. The Act was passed with “broad, bipartisan support” and an “enthusiastic” President Reagan. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 90, at 48.
93 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 2017 (“There is established as an independent
commission in the judicial branch of the United States a United States Sentencing
Commission . . . .”).
94 Id. The President is responsible for appointing voting members of the Commission,
with approval from the Senate. A minimum of three members of the Commission had to
be active federal judges, and no more than four members could be from the same political
party. Id. The members were removable only for good cause. Id. at 2018. The minimum
of three federal judges was changed to a maximum with the Feeney Amendment to the
PROTECT Act. Oleson, supra note 89, at 732.

2190

notre dame law review

[vol. 92:5

sentencing.”95 The SRA assisted the Commission by detailing organically the
things judges should consider in imposing a sentence.96 They included:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines that are issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(1) and that are in effect on the
date the defendant is sentenced;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2) and that is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced; and
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.97

In short, the SRA “did not give the Commission a clean slate upon which
to draft its Guidelines.”98 Congress intended the Commission to focus on
the generally recognized purposes of punishment.99 However, Congress did
not specify what purpose would predominate.100
The lack of a clear sentencing philosophy was felt early by the Commission101and “[f]or the first eighteen months of its existence, [it] debated and
drafted competing versions of the Guidelines, each built on fundamentally
95 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2017, 2018.
96 See id. at 1989.
97 Id. at 1989–90.
98 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 90, at 52.
99 Id. The four purposes of punishment are generally recognized as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Oleson, supra note 89, at 696.
100 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 90, at 52 (“Congress in the Sentencing Reform
Act had failed to adopt any particular philosophy of punishment.”); Paul J. Hofer & Mark
H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 29 (2003) (“[T]he SRA does not specify
priorities among these purposes or explain how the well-known tensions among them
should be resolved.”).
101 However, the Commission did take the interest in sentencing uniformity to heart,
claiming more than a decade after its creation that “[e]liminating unwarranted sentencing
disparity was the primary goal of the Sentencing Reform Act.” PAUL J. HOFER ET AL., U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW
WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING
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different philosophies.”102 A clear philosophy was never attained, and some
of the Commission’s members even resigned because of it.103 The Commission ultimately adopted an approach that sampled ten thousand cases and
“determined the average sentences for various types of crime and the aggravating and mitigating factors that were significantly correlated with increases
or decreases in the sentences, along with each factor’s magnitude.”104
While the Commission never chose a formal philosophy for sentencing,
it did appear to be “significantly influenced” by a stricter, quantitative
calculus.105 In fact, the Guidelines go further than the SRA calls for in ensuring that additional harms are met with additional punishment.106 Still, even
in the years since its creation the Commission has not resolved nor even
addressed its sentencing philosophy.107
Before understanding any critique of the Guidelines, it is important to
have a basic understanding of how they work. Fortunately, the Commission
provides a handy overview of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.108 The
overview explains the Guidelines’s creation of a formulaic sentencing chart,
which “take[s] into account both the seriousness of the offense and the
offender’s criminal history.”109 There are forty-three levels of offense seriousness (one being the least serious), and each type of crime has a base offense
level.110 The sentencing judge begins by determining the base offense level
for the crime committed (for multiple counts the judge begins with the most
serious offense), and then looks to see if there are any specific offense characteristics to consider. If so, they get added to the base offense level. For
example, robbery has a base offense level of twenty; if a firearm was brandished during the robbery there must be a five-level increase, and if a firearm
was discharged there must be a seven-level increase.111 There are also adjustREFORM 79 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf.
102 Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 100, at 31.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 33 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 16 (1987), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/1987/manual-pdf/1987_Supplementary_Report_Initial_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf.); see id. at 17–19.
105 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 90, at 55. This approach more mirrors the philosophy of Commissioner Robinson, a law professor at Rutgers, who believed that the purpose
of sentencing was to achieve retribution, and that this is best accomplished with a “sentencing calculus,” a detailed and complex sentencing system. See id. at 50–53.
106 Id. at 55; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(l) (2012).
107 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 90, at 56.
108 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/Overview_Federal_
Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf.
109 Id. at 1.
110 Id.
111 Id.
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ments that may apply to any crime and can be mitigating, such as being a
minimal participant (a four-level decrease), or aggravating, such as knowing
the victim is unusually vulnerable (a two-level increase).112 Finally, acceptance of responsibility may result in up to a two-level decrease.113 The final
number arrived at through this system determines the placement along the yaxis. The judge then determines the criminal history category (situated
along the x-axis), which is six categories with I being the least serious and
first-time offenders, and VI being the most serious. The point at which the
offense level and criminal history categories intersect determines the sentencing guideline in months.114
The response to the Guidelines has been mixed, at best. Many scholars
argue that the system needs to be improved,115 and others that it needs to be
abolished.116 The common complaints are that the Guidelines are too
severe, complex, and rigid.117
While a primary motivation for the Sentencing Guidelines was curbing
sentence disparity, Congress made clear the direction in which it believed the
disparity should be resolved.118 Congress directed the Commission to “specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term
authorized” for certain types of crimes.119 Congress further stipulated that
“[t]he Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the fact that, in
112 Id. at 2.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2–3.
115 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal
Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 366 (2012) (“The Sentencing Commission’s
rule-making process should be made more akin to that required of other independent
agencies by the Administrative Procedure Act and other governmental openness statutes,
and a mechanism for direct judicial review of the Commission’s rules should be devised.”);
Oleson, supra note 89, at 763 (“Instead of basing federal sentences on political intuitions,
the Commission could provide sentencing judges with meaningful data about which available sentences are most effective in reducing recidivism.”). But see Paul G. Cassell, Too
Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (2004) (“While the Guidelines may be tough, they
merely impose the kind of punishment that society expects for serious federal offenses.”).
116 See Mark Osler, Death to These Guidelines, and a Clean Sheet of Paper, 21 FED. SENT’G
REP. 7, 7 (2008) (“The Guidelines produced from these policy goals are a baffling set of
complexities that do nothing well other than increase incarceration and guarantee the full
employment of sentencing experts. It is time to start over.”); Erik Luna, Misguided Guidelines: A Critique of Federal Sentencing 23 (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis, Paper No. 458, 2002)
(“American conceptions of justice demand that the Guidelines be scrapped and the commission disbanded.”).
117 Oleson, supra note 89, at 707.
118 See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012).
119 Id. § 994(h). But see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary . . . .”).
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many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the
offense.”120
The impact on increased sentence length due to the Guidelines is real
and observable. Since the adoption of the Guidelines, federal sentences have
increased drastically,121 and federal sentences are significantly harsher than
state sentences on average.122 The severity of the sentences has led to an
outcry among judges,123 politicians,124 families,125 and academics.126
The complexity of the Guidelines is another issue. Given how the overview that the Commission provides breaks down the sentencing process, it is
120 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).
121 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 90, at 63 tbl.1 (demonstrating that the seven years
after the Guidelines have seen markedly longer sentences than did the nine years prior).
All crimes have an average sentence length of twenty-two more months. While robbery has
a thirty-nine-month-shorter sentence length, its time served is still thirty-nine months more
than before the Guidelines. Id.
122 See Oleson, supra note 89, at 707–08 (“[T]here’s little doubt that sentences associated with crimes charged under federal jurisdiction are dramatically longer than equivalent
crimes charged in state courts.”); see also MATTHEW DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, 2004—STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.1.10
(2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04110tab.cfm (demonstrating that most federal crimes result in significantly higher sentences than state crimes).
However, one large exception to the rule is murder, which has an average sentence in state
courts of 232 months, compared to 111 months in federal courts. Yet, violent crime as a
whole carries twenty-eight months more in federal court. Drug and weapons offenses are
particularly more severe, with an average of fifty-three and fifty-two more months, respectively. Id.
123 See, e.g., Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Speech at
the American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_08-09-03.html (“Our resources are
misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences too long.”); see also Elaine Cassel,
Federal Judge Quits, Assails Unjust Sentencing Guidelines, COUNTERPUNCH (June 24, 2003),
http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/06/24/federal-judge-quits-assails-unjust-sentencingguidelines/.
124 See Ann E. Marimow, All Agree His Sentence Was Too Harsh, But He May Still Stay Locked
Up Forever, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/all-agree-his-sentence-was-too-harsh-but-he-may-still-stay-locked-up-forever/2016/
03/22/0d34aea2-ed3e-11e5-bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html (“President Obama and
lawmakers on Capitol Hill[ ] are working to roll back decades of prison sentences, set
down during the nation’s war on drugs, that they see as excessively harsh.”).
125 See My Story: Simeon F., FAMM, http://famm.org/my-story-simeon-f/ (last visited
Dec. 19, 2017) (“[A] misguided sentence . . . has cost society more than it stands to impact
[my incarcerated son, Paul]. Paul does not need to be imprisoned for another decade. He
needs to be released and reunited with his family.”).
126 See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1328 (2005) (“At or near the root of virtually every
serious criticism of the guidelines is the concern that they are too harsh, that federal law
requires imposition of prison sentences too often and for terms that are too long.”); John
S. Martin, Jr., Cruel and Usual: Sentencing in the Federal Courts, 26 PACE L. REV. 489, 490
(2006) (“[O]verly severe sentences are being applied to low level violators.”).

2194

notre dame law review

[vol. 92:5

reasonable to believe that the system is a relatively straightforward math
problem.127 Determine the defendant’s x- and y-axes, and you have your
sentence range. However, the impression of mathematical certainty is one
thing critics attack:
Voila! A human being has been transformed from a multidimensional
being into a string of letters and numbers . . . for internment in a federal
penitentiary. The defendant is now a two-dimensional character . . . .
[F]ederal judges cannot consider . . . age, education, vocational skills,
mental and emotional condition, physical condition, drug or alcohol dependence, lack of guidance as a youth, employment history, family ties and
responsibilities, community ties, military and public service, and charitable
works.128

Furthermore, the mathematical formula in practice can turn out to be
not so simple. The system “sometimes result[s] in sentences that are off by
years.”129 The system has been empirically demonstrated as susceptible to
error. A study on the reliability of the Guidelines showed that “[o]fficers
applying the relevant conduct rules produce[ ] widely divergent outcomes,
ranging from 57 to 136 months for the first defendant, 37 to 136 months for
the second defendant, and 24 to 136 months for the third defendant.”130
Finally, the system is faulted for being too rigid. In 2003, Congress
attempted to make the Guidelines even more rigid by passing the Feeney
Amendment to the PROTECT Act.131 The Feeney Amendment “was a slap
in the face of federal judges” and took incredible strides to limit downward
departures from the Guidelines.132 However, in United States v. Booker the
Supreme Court “severed and excised” the provision of the federal sentencing
statute that made the Guidelines mandatory.133 But the Guidelines were
127
128

See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 38–39 (2005) (“Under the Guidelines, judges thus confront defendants as
numbers rather than as human beings.”).
129 Luna, supra note 116, at 12.
130 Oleson, supra note 89, at 714 n.129 (citing Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An
Empirical Study of the Application of the Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1B1.3, 10 FED. SENT’G REP.
16, 18–19 (1997)).
131 See Pub. L. No 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667 (2003) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b) (2012)).
132 Oleson, supra note 89, at 731 (“It prohibited judges from departing downward in
almost all cases involving child pornography, sexual abuse, or sex trafficking; prohibited
the Commission from establishing any new grounds for downward departures for two
years; and directed the Commission to reduce the number of available downward departures.” (footnotes omitted)). The Feeney Amendment was, in part, due to federal judges
departing from the guidelines, and Congress’s displeasure with them. See David Beck, Is
Our Judiciary Under Serious Attack? Separation of Powers, 67 TEX. B.J. 974, 976–77 (2004); see
also infra note 141 and accompanying text.
133 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
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allowed to stand and still had to be consulted by sentencing judges.134 Nonetheless, the decision to make the Guidelines explicitly advisory did not result
in defendants receiving less harsh sentences from judges. It is maintained
that “[s]o long as the rules prescribe unduly lengthy sentences, post-Booker
experience suggests that most defendants for whom those sentences are prescribed will get them, or at best sentences only slightly lower.”135
Further, although the Guidelines are now explicitly only advisory, reversal or binding rules are not the only tools that could be employed against
recalcitrant judges. Prior to the Booker decision, Congress threatened to subpoena records related to a federal judge’s sentencing decisions.136 Although
infrequently exercised, this power nonetheless may motivate some judges to
stay inside the Guidelines just to avoid having their decisions called into
question.
Intentionally or not, just or not, the Guidelines are detrimental to
defendants during sentencing. The next Part of this Note will compare the
possible changes in the Act to the current federal system and suggest how the
Act can best be implemented.
III. HOW BEST

TO

MOVE FORWARD

WITH

MILITARY SENTENCING

All things being equal, the implementation of sentencing parameters
would likely be to the detriment of military defendants. The Panel is not
specifically directed to create a set of parameters. However, it is not difficult
to see that the recommendation of creating the Board led to the creation of
the Panel. Congress may have bought itself more time, but it did not eliminate the possibility of sentencing parameters being created in the military. It
may have even given the eventual implementation of parameters a possible
way forward. However, regardless of whether parameters are created in the
military or not, a two-day delay prior to sentencing can lead to more effective
sentences.
In creating the Commission, Congress both burdened it with countless
objectives and provided no primary direction.137 It is generally accepted that
the Commission has never tackled this problem, and the lack of a clear sen134 Id. “[T]he federal sentencing statute as amended makes the Guidelines effectively
advisory. It requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, but it permits the
court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns . . . .” Id. at 245–46 (citations omitted).
135 Bowman, supra note 115, at 360.
136 See Tresa Baldas, Congress Comes After a Federal Judge; Sentencing at Issue in Subpoena
Uproar, NAT’L L.J., (Mar. 24, 2003), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/
id=900005534745/Congress-Comes-After-a-Federal-Judge?slreturn=20161017231037
(“[U.S. District Court Judge James] Rosenbaum . . . is accused of imposing unlawfully light
sentences.”). It was argued that Congress did this in “an effort to chill and intimidate
judges by subjecting their decisions to this kind of data and collection and review.” Id.
137 See supra notes 101–07 and accompanying text.
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tencing philosophy plagues its Guidelines.138 Even if the Panel does not face
conflicting guidance it does not necessarily have a golden ticket to a successful mission. The Panel, full of different lawyers with different backgrounds
and ideas, will still face the issue of assessing sentencing throughout the
entire Department of Defense.139 Furthermore, the Panel will have to juggle
this with the additional military justice goal of maintaining good order and
discipline. Congress, through the MJRG’s language, may have given a hint to
the Panel that its focus should first be on good order and discipline. The
language of the Act, in regards to sentencing, claims the punishment shall
“promote justice and . . . maintain good order and discipline” taking into
consideration the other sentencing philosophies.140 Good order and discipline is to be maintained through the effective use of other philosophies, not
the other way around.141 Nonetheless, the Panel may still have to wrestle
with what theory of punishment best promotes good order and discipline
and how best to go about emphasizing that theory.
If the Panel does decide to move forward with recommending parameters, it must do so in a way that responds to the severity, complexity, and
rigidness that plague the federal system. And while Booker made clear that
any attempt at binding federal guidelines was unconstitutional, even suggestive parameters may still in effect be unduly restrictive.142 This could go even
further in the military context. While a military judge is protected by the
UCMJ from undue command influence, it is unlikely a military judge, or any
judge, will be unaware of outside pressures. To be effective, and to keep
judges effective, if it chooses to implement parameters the Panel needs to
ensure that it assuages judges’ concerns about any type of retribution for a
decision, and that it educates military judges on the best practices for departing from the parameters.
Currently, in the federal system, upon a plea or a finding of guilty, a
probation officer conducts a presentence investigation and submits a report
to the court.143 The report must be submitted to the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, and the Government’s attorney at least thirty-five days before
138 See supra notes 101–07 and accompanying text.
139 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328,
§ 5521, 130 Stat. 2962 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
140 Id. § 5301, 130 Stat. 2919.
141 This focus for the military is not new and has been respected by the courts. See
Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion) (“Military law . . . is a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment. . . . [T]he rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be
conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil
courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in this
adjustment.” (footnote omitted)).
142 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
143 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.1 cmt. (2015) (“A thorough presentence investigation ordinarily is essential in determining the facts relevant to
sentencing.”). This general requirement cannot be waived by the defendant. Id.
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sentencing.144 Both parties have fourteen days to respond, and the probation officer must submit the final presentence report to the parties at least
seven days before sentencing.145 This process is relatively removed from the
adversarial nature of a trial, and more in line with the calculating nature of
sentencing.
The Act does not suggest that adversarial aspects of sentencing will
change. However, the military system expects sentencing to be completed as
quickly after the trial as possible.146 Occasionally, if a verdict is delivered
later in the day, a military judge may push the sentence on to the next duty
day, or it can be pushed back a few hours, but this is not required.147 The
expectation of the lawyers is that their arguments are prepared and their
witnesses ready to be called if the sentencing phase immediately follows
trial.148 Because there is no presentencing report agreed to by the parties,
the prosecution must prove any aggravating circumstances.149 The defense
is also given “considerable latitude” in presenting witnesses and mitigating
evidence.150
A reasonable opportunity exists for the prosecution and defense to make
sound sentencing arguments. The deck is stacked against no one, and both
are given reasonable latitude. However, that reasonable opportunity for
soundness does not necessarily translate into the best process for a just sentence. The defendant may be left reeling that he or she was just convicted of
a crime, possibly a serious one, even as a mitigation case needs to be
presented. The defense attorney presumably will have done everything
within reason to obtain a not-guilty verdict for the defendant whose case was
just argued, and then must immediately be prepared to demonstrate why that
guilty client should be given a lenient sentence. To make any sort of coherent argument, and certainly to have witnesses prepared, the defense attorney
must plan on this contingency before beginning the trial. The defense attorney would make a better, more reasoned argument for mitigation if that was
the only argument to prepare. Instead, sometimes the following arguments
are what the court-martial and defendant get: “The accused needs to be with
his family. Years in prison will only mean that he may never see them again.
They need him. Any double digit number is going to be too much.”151 The
preceding sentencing arguments might have been better and more reasoned
144 Id. § 6A1.2(a). This requirement can be waived by the defendant. Id.
145 Id. § 6A1.2(b)–(c).
146 See MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 1001(a)(2) (“A sentence shall be adjudged in all
cases without unreasonable delay.”).
147 Robert F. Holland, Unique Procedural Aspects of Court-Martial Sentencing by Jury, 27 FED.
SENT’G REP. 91, 93 (2014).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Charles L. Pritchard, Jr., “Punished as a Court-Martial May Direct”: Making Meaningful
Sentence Requests, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2015, at 33 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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if the defense attorney had two days after the trial to focus on the sentencing
argument. It is not unreasonable to expect, along the same lines, that the
defense attorney may serve as better counsel during the trial if the only focus
was on a not-guilty verdict.
Furthermore, the trial counsel is affected in much the same way. While
the trial counsel will not need to turn around from a loss, the preparation
will still be divided up between two tasks instead of focused on one. In the
case of a not-guilty verdict, the trial counsel’s time spent preparing for sentencing may have been spent better in preparation for the trial phase.
Finally, it is not unreasonable to expect that the trial counsel’s personal feelings of frustration towards the defendant will carry over into sentencing. In
the current environment, trial counsel may resort to arguments like the following: “The accused needs to go to jail for at least twenty-eight years. He is
twenty-two years old right now. He will be fifty when he gets out. . . . Your
Honor, you should add up the minor victims’ ages and make the accused
serve confinement for that long.”152 These haphazard arguments may be
improved if the trial counsel has time to prepare and does not face multiple
contingencies within fixed time constraints.
Finally, a delay of two days between conviction and sentencing may have
a strong impact on the defendant. In civilian courts, an “[e]xpression[ ] of
remorse can reduce prison sentences by more than a third.”153 Imagine the
mindset of a defendant who just spent an entire trial proclaiming his innocence but is nonetheless convicted of the crime. Then consider that in order
to receive a smaller sentence, that defendant is expected to make a heartfelt
apology shortly after, even within a few hours. Two days would give the
defendant the opportunity to come to grips with the guilt just assigned by the
community, and coming to grips with that guilt may lead to a more heartfelt
apology. This may benefit the rehabilitation of the defendant, and “victims
themselves say that emotional harm is healed, as opposed to compensated
for, only by an act of emotional repair.”154 It is no secret that apologies from
the guilty “often are stilted, forced, or just not enough.”155 But the possibility
of an improved apology is worth the negligible risks.
A mandatory delay between a conviction and sentencing is not without
precedent. In the late 1950s the appellate division of New York’s supreme
court held in several cases that a trial court must follow a statute requiring a
two-day delay between a guilty verdict (including a plea) and sentencing, and
failure of a trial court to do so would invalidate a sentencing.156 A defendant
in Oregon has a statutory right of two calendar days following a guilty plea or
152 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153 STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 74 (2012).
154 Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative
Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 22.
155 BIBAS, supra note 153, at 74.
156 See, e.g., People ex rel. La Shombe v. Jackson, 184 N.Y.S.2d 949, 949 (App. Div. 1959)
(“A failure to allow two days between conviction and sentence, if properly pleaded . . .
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verdict before sentencing.157 In State v. Dawson the Oregon Court of Appeals
held that a violation of the statute is cause for a remand and resentencing.158
During a turn-of-the-century murder case in Kentucky, the highest court
determined that a violation of the criminal code that mandated a two-day
delay between a verdict and judgment warranted a reversal.159 It reasoned
that the code “contain[ed] a most solemn and vital right of the accused. Its
meaning is upon the surface. It requires no reflection to understand it. It
was enacted for the express purpose of giving the accused time in which to
show cause against the sentence about to be passed upon him.”160
One clear implication of this suggested delay is a slowdown of justice.
However, as noted above, in the federal system there are at least thirty-five
days between a conviction or guilty plea and sentencing (plus however long it
takes the probation officer to submit the report).161 A delay of a few days
pales in comparison to that month. Furthermore, just as a defendant can
waive this time requirement in the federal system (although there will still
likely be a brief delay as the probation officer writes the report), this option
could also be given to defendants in a court-martial. Either before or after
the trial the judge can ask the defendant if he would like to waive his right to
a brief delay before sentencing.
But the importance of speedy justice has an impact on the functionality
of the military as well.162 The military functions as smaller units that are part
of larger units, and “everyone knows or at least has a perception about when
and whether ‘justice has been done.’ ”163 However, the delays that have
caused concerns in the military process come not from the sentencing phase
of a court-martial but from the post-sentencing process.164 Given the
would invalidate the sentence.”); People ex rel. Ingber v. Jackson, 172 N.Y.S.2d 358, 358
(App. Div. 1958) (same concept).
157 See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.020 (2015). The court may sentence sooner if it does not
intend to be in session, but it should be “as remote a time as can reasonably be allowed,”
and no sooner than six hours unless waived by the defendant. Id.
158 284 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (“[O]ur focus is on the court’s disregard of
an important statutory right . . . whose purpose, in part, is to ensure the deliberate and
carefully considered pronouncement of judgment in criminal cases.”).
159 Powers v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1904).
160 Id. at 148; see also People v. Felix, 45 Cal. 163, 164 (1872) (“The purpose of the
statute seems to be to guard the rights of the prisoner from a hasty or too precipitous entry
of judgment against him.”).
161 See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
162 See Baker, supra note 29, at 81 (“[T]he timely administration of justice, has long
been viewed as a strength of the military justice system.”).
163 Id.
164 See id. (“[M]ilitary case law makes clear . . . that there have been problems with
appellate delay in the military . . . . [T]he convening authority in approving findings and
sentence as well as in reviewing for clemency often adds weeks, months, and sometimes
even years to the court-martial process.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13,
23 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (“Simply stated, the 2,031 days for a first-level appellate review by a
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extraordinary length of sentencing delays that can occur after courts-martial
conclude, it is unreasonable to argue that a few days in between conviction
and sentencing will unduly prejudice good order and discipline. Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, there may be other options available
to remove the defendant from the unit.165
A final argument against the delay between a conviction and sentencing
is that it may lead to disruptions of an efficient military justice system. This
argument falls short because the federal system has demonstrated an ability
to operate without an immediate rush from conviction to sentencing. Furthermore, the military justice system operates with a “relatively light
caseload—extremely light compared with civilian criminal justice systems.”166 Finding the time for two segmented phases of a court-martial may
initially prove more complicated, but will likely just become part of the process with which the military justice system functions. Finally, this recommendation has the ability to actually increase efficiency in the military justice
system by minimizing wasted work. In the case of a not-guilty verdict, neither
the defense attorney nor trial counsel will have spent government time and
resources preparing for sentencing.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing recommendations to improve implementation of the Act
need not happen overnight. Effectively implementing just the changes the
Act recommends may be trouble enough initially. A two-day delay between a
conviction and sentencing does not have to come from an act of Congress,
an order from the President, or a recommendation from the Panel. Individual services, and even individual judges, can create opportunities to observe
the recommended delay and determine if it improves the military justice system. At little or no cost to the machine, the proposed delay may bring out
the best in all involved in the military sentencing process.
service court of criminal appeals is facially unreasonable as it clearly is excessive and inordinate.”); United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 136–37 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (holding that 1688
days between the conclusion of the court-martial and the decision of the Court of Criminal
Appeals was facially unreasonable and that 490 days between the court-martial and
approval by the convening authority was excessive).
165 The most severe avenue available is pretrial confinement. Probable cause must exist
for pretrial confinement, which consists of a reasonable belief that: “(1) An offense triable
by court-martial has been committed; (2) The person confined committed it; and (3) Confinement is required by the circumstances.” MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 305. The
required circumstances are that it is foreseeable that the defendant will not appear at trial
or will engage in “serious criminal misconduct,” and restraint of a less severe nature is
inadequate. Id. Also available is pretrial restraint, a less severe restriction on a person’s
liberty. It may consist of conditions on liberty, restriction in lieu of arrest, arrest, or confinement. Id. R.C.M. 304.
166 Ehlenbeck, supra note 36, at 33.
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A delay between conviction and sentencing will not create a perfect sentence for a guilty defendant, nor a perfect system for military sentencing.
But, it may be able to make military justice better.
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